We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two results. (1) The degree of informal insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured by the number of connections that groups of agents have with the rest of the community, relative to group size. Twodimensional networks, where people have connections in multiple directions, are su¢ ciently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. We show that social networks in Peruvian villages satisfy this dimensionality property; thus, our model can explain Townsend's (1994) puzzling observation that village communities often exhibit close to full insurance. (2) In second-best arrangements, agents organize in endogenous "risk-sharing islands" in the network, where shocks are shared fully within, but imperfectly across islands. As a result, network based risk-sharing is local: socially closer agents insure each other more.
In much of the developing world, people face severe income ‡uctuations due to weather shocks, diseases a¤ecting crops and livestock, and other factors. These ‡uctuations are costly because households are poor and lack access to formal insurance markets. Informal risk-sharing arrangements, which help cope with this risk through transfers and gifts, are therefore widespread. For example, Figure 1 depicts …nancial and in-kind transfers between relatives and friends in a rural village in the Huaraz province of Peru. On the one hand, these arrangements often seem to be based on local obligations, as people mainly help out close neighbors, relatives and friends (Udry 1994) . On the other hand, these local mechanisms often achieve almost full global insurance on the village level. For example, (Townsend 1994) argues that the full insurance model provides a surprisingly good benchmark even though it is typically rejected in the data. How can local obligations and transfers aggregate up to good global risk-sharing? We build a simple model of risk-sharing in social networks that provides an explanation for this puzzle. We …nd that full insurance is di¢ cult to obtain because it requires a high level of connectedness that we do not observe in real social network data. However, consistent with the evidence, we also show that close to perfect risk-sharing can be achieved for the type of more loosely connected social networks that we do observe. Our model also allows us to study the nature of informal risk-sharing arrangements. We show that households' consumption will comove more strongly with that of socially closer households, a prediction consistent with the empirical …ndings in Angelucci, Giorgi, Rangel and Rasul (2008) , who therefore provide indirect evidence for our model.
We model the social network as a set of pre-existing relationships, like friendships and family ties. These links have utility value, which represents either the direct consumption value of relationships, or indirect bene…ts from future transactions. We de…ne a risk-sharing arrangement as a set of transfers between direct neighbors in the social network in every 1 The data used in constructing this Figure were collected by Karlan, Mobius and Rosenblat (2007) . See Appendix B for details.
2 Also see Ogaki and Zhang (2001) and Mazzocco (2007) .
arrangements has two implications. First, it shows that decentralized insurance arrangements can also be implemented in a centralized fashion through intermediaries such as trusted village elders, who respect the obligations of each group (e.g., extended family) in the community. Second, the result relates the geometry of the network to its e¤ectiveness for risksharing, allowing us to study how local links aggregate to social capital at the community level.
The key property of network structure identi…ed by our equivalence result is called expansiveness, and measures the number of connections that groups of agents have with the rest of the community relative to group size. To gain intuition about this property, consider the three example networks in Figure 2 . Among these networks, the in…nite line in Figure   2A is the least expansive, because any connected set of agents always has only two links with the rest of the community. The in…nite "plane" network of Figure 2B is more expansive, while the in…nite binary tree of Figure 2C is the most expansive network of all, where the number of outgoing links for any set grows at least proportionally with its size. 
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We show that full insurance requires highly expansive networks like the in…nite binary tree. However, we do not …nd that real-world social networks in rural villages in Peru exhibit this large degree of expansiveness. Instead, these social networks are more similar to planar networks, possibly because people tend to have connections at close geographic distance. We next show that a two-dimensional structure, such as found in our Peruvian data, is su¢ cient to ensure very good risk-sharing in most states of the world. For an intuition, consider a connected group of agents in the plane network. With idiosyncratic shocks, the standard deviation of the total endowment of the group is proportional to the square root of group size.
But on the plane, the number of outgoing links from the group is also at least proportional to the square root of size (the worst case would be when the group has a square shape).
Thus group obligations with the rest of the community -links connecting the group with the network -are of the same order of magnitude as group shocks. Since this holds for every group, it follows that "almost" full risk-sharing can be implemented in the network. This argument applies not just for the regular plane network, but for any social network which has a two-dimensional sub-structure. We call these networks geographic networks and we show that our Peruvian village networks fall into this class. As a result, our model provides a potential explanation for the informal insurance puzzle highlighted by Townsend.
The above results constitute a quantitative analysis of informal risk-sharing. Our second main contribution is a qualitative analysis of constrained e¢ cient "second-best" arrangements. We show that in these arrangements, the network can be partitioned into endogenously organized connected groups called "risk-sharing islands" for every realization of uncertainty. This partition has the property that shocks are completely shared within, but only imperfectly across islands. The island structure can be understood in terms of "almost deviating coalitions,"who are indi¤erent between staying in the network and deviating as a group. Islands are maximal connected sets subject to the constraint that they are not divided by any almost deviating coalition; therefore, insurance across island boundaries is limited, but insurance within islands is complete. The size and location of these risk-pooling islands is endogenously determined by the social structure and the realization of endowment shocks, consistent with evidence documented by Attanasio, Barr, Cardenasy, Genicot and Meghir (2009) , and distinguishing our model from theories with exogenously speci…ed risk-sharing groups.
A key implication of the islands result is that an agent's consumption will comove more with the consumption of closely connected neighbors. This follows because islands are connected subgraphs: agents who are socially closer are more likely to belong to the same island and thus provide more insurance. This observation helps characterize informal insurance as a function of shock size. Risk-sharing works well for relatively small shocks: sharing islands are large, and both direct and indirect friends help out. As the size of the shock increases, only close friends help with the additional burden; and risk-sharing completely breaks down for large shocks. Some of these predictions are con…rmed in the empirical work of Angelucci et al. (2008) .
Our paper builds on a growing literature studying informal insurance in networks. Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008) develop a model with both informational and commitment constraints, and characterize network structures that are stable under certain exogenously speci…ed risk-sharing arrangements. We conduct the opposite investigation: taking the network as given, we study the degree and structure of informal risk-sharing. Bramoulle and Kranton (2006) also study insurance arrangements in networks, but in their model there are no enforcement constraints. Our modeling approach builds on Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat and Szeidl (2009) , who explore informal borrowing in networks.
3 Empirical work in this area includes De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) , Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , who use data on village networks, Attanasio et al. (2009) who document the importance of social ties for risk-pooling, while Mazzocco (2007) emphasizes the role of within-caste transfers.
More broadly, our work contributes to the growing literature on informal institutions. Kandori (1992) , Ellison (1994) and Greif (1993) develop game-theoretic models of community enforcement, and Kranton (1996) studies the interaction between relational and formal markets. In the context of consumption insurance, Ligon (1998) , Coate and Ravaillon (1993) , Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) explore related models with limited commitment, while Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) are in ‡uential empirical studies of consumption insurance. These papers do not study the e¤ects of network structure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our model of informal insurance in networks. Section 2 characterizes the limits to risk-sharing, and confronts the theoretical results with data on social networks in Peru. Section 3 analyses constrained e¢ cient arrangements. Section 4 explores a more general version of our model and Section 5 concludes. Proofs are delegated to Appendix A and a supplementary appendix.
1 A model of risk-sharing in the network
Model setup
In our model, agents face income uncertainty due to factors such as weather shocks and crop diseases. In the absence of a formal insurance market, agents can agree on an informal risk-sharing agreement that speci…es transfers between pairs of agents in each state of the world. These transfers are secured by the social network: connections in the network have an associated consumption value that is lost if an agent fails to make a promised transfer.
Formally, a social network G = (W; L) consists of a set W of agents (vertices) and a set L of links, where a link is an unordered pair of distinct vertices. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the network is …nite; the supplementary appendix discusses how to extend our setup to in…nite networks. Each link in the network represents a friendship or business relationship between the two parties involved. We assume that the strength of these relationships is determined outside the model, and that they are measured by a capacity.
De…nition 1 A capacity is a function c :
The capacity of an (i; j) link measures the bene…t that i derives from his relationship with j. These bene…ts can represent the direct utility that agents derive from interacting with each other, or the utility or monetary value of economic interaction in the present or in future periods. For ease of presentation, we assume that the strength of relationships is symmetric, so that c(i; j) = c(j; i) for all i and j. e on e for the rest of the paper.
An agent who consumes x i enjoys utility U i (x i ; c i ), where c i = P j c(i; j) denotes the total value that agent i derives from all his relationships in the network, and U is strictly increasing and concave. To simplify exposition, in the body of the paper we focus on the analytically convenient case where consumption and friendship are perfect substitutes, so that the utility of i is U i (x i + c i ). Section 4 develops the model with imperfect substitutes, and shows that under weak conditions, all our qualitative conclusions extend. The agent's ex-ante expected payo¤ is EU i (x i + c i ), where the expectation is taken over the realization of endowment shocks.
We say that a risk-sharing arrangement is incentive compatible if every agent i prefers to make each of his promised transfers t ij rather than lose the (i; j) link and its associated value. Because consumption and friendships are perfect substitutes, incentive compatibility implies t ij c(i; j).
Discussion of modeling assumptions
Risk-sharing arrangement. The most literal interpretation of these arrangements, in the spirit of Arrow and Debreu, is that agents choose an ex ante informal contract, which speci…es payments for every conceivable realization of uncertainty. Alternatively, the consumption allocation may also be determined ex post by a social norm that speci…es how to reallocate goods among connected agents. For example, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) describe how informal insurance is implemented through a collection of bilateral "quasi-loans," where households borrow from neighbors, who expect their kindness returned when they themselves are hit by adverse shocks. in a network where links and capacities are determined outside the model. The most direct interpretation of this framework is that link values are generated by a number of social activities and services besides risk-sharing. In this interpretation, the links themselves may be created through a long term network formation process largely shaped by factors outside our model, such kinship and geographic proximity. However, our setup can also be viewed as a "snapshot"of a dynamic model, where the value of a network connection is determined in part by the ability to conduct insurance transactions through the link in the future. In such a dynamic model, link capacities would be endogenized by the expected future bene…ts from risk-sharing. As Bloch et al. (2008) show in a similar model, this leads to restrictions on the equilibrium network structure and link values. While our static analysis applies for any set of capacities, our results could presumably be strengthened by imposing such restrictions on the network. We plan to explore the implications of dynamics more explicitly in future work.
Incentive compatibility. Our notion of incentive compatibility is motivated by Karlan et al. (2009) . In their model of informal borrowing, a link between two agents is destroyed if a promised transfer is not made. They develop explicit micro-foundations for this assumption where the failure to make a transfer is a signal that the agent no longer values his friend, in which case these former friends …nd it optimal not to interact with each other in the future. 4 An alternative justi…cation is that people break a link for emotional or instinctive reasons when a promise is not kept; Fehr and Gachter (2000) provide evidence for such behavior.
Full information. Our model assumes that agents in the community can observe the vector of endowment realization so that they know what transfer payments to expect from their neighbors and how much to send. Full information about endowments seems reasonable in village environments, where individuals can easily observe the state of livestock or crops. For example, Udry (1994) , shows that asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders is relatively unimportant in villages in Northern Nigeria.
Coalition-proof allocations
We …rst show that incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements give rise to consumption allocations that are coalition-proof in every state of the world in the following sense. The net transfer between any group of agents and the rest of the community, de…ned as the di¤erence between the group's total endowment and total consumption, cannot exceed the sum of the values of all links connecting the group and the rest of the community. Formally, for any group F we de…ne the perimeter c [F ] to be sum of the values of all links between the group and the rest of the community:
Intuitively, the perimeter is the "joint obligation"of the group F to the rest of the community. Similarly, we de…ne the joint endowment of the group as e F and the joint consumption allocation induced by the risk-sharing arrangement with x F . Coalition-proofness then re-
for all F , i.e., the net transfer from the group to the community cannot exceed the group's joint obligation c [F ].
5 Surprisingly, coalition-proofness tightly characterizes all the consumption allocations that are implementable through informal risk-sharing.
Theorem 1 A consumption allocation x that is feasible ( That an incentive compatible allocation is coalition proof is easy to see: since each transfer is bounded by the capacity of the link, the same inequality must also hold when transfers are added up along the perimeter of a group. Proving the converse is more di¢ cult, and builds on the mathematical theory of network ‡ows. Recall that the maximum ‡ow between nodes s and t in a network is the highest amount that can ‡ow from s to t along the edges respecting the capacity constraints. Finding a transfer representation for a coalition-proof allocation turns out to be equivalent to …nding a ‡ow in an auxiliary network with two additional nodes s and t added. According to the theorem of Ford and Fulkerson (1956) , the maximum ‡ow equals the value of the minimum cut, i.e., the smallest capacity that must be deleted so that s and t end up in di¤erent components. We prove in Appendix A that each cut in the ‡ow problem corresponds to a coalition, and then the coalition-proofness condition ensures that the cut values are high enough so that the desired ‡ow can be implemented.
The theorem has two main implications. First, it shows how individual obligations aggregate up to social capital at the community level. Links matter not because they act as conduits for transfer, but because they de…ne the pattern of obligations in the community.
In particular, a coalition-proof arrangement does not have to be implemented by transfers over links: intermediaries such as village elders could also collect and distribute resources, as long as they respect the obligations of each group of households, i.e., coalition-proofness.
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Hence our model need not predict long chains of transfers in practice: these chains are likely to be shortened by intermediaries.
A second implication of the theorem is that it relates the geometry of the network to its e¤ectiveness for risk-sharing. This connection forms the basis of our analysis in the following section.
The limits to risk-sharing
In this section use the equivalence between incentive compatibility and coalition-proofness to explore how much risk-sharing can be obtained in a given network. Our central …nding is that good risk-sharing requires social networks to have good "expansion properties"; that is, all groups of agents should have enough connections with the rest of the community, relative to group size.
Limits to full risk-sharing
We …rst use Theorem 1 to establish a negative result: full risk-sharing cannot be achieved unless the network is extremely expansive, because coalitions with a relatively low "group obligation"c [F ] will choose to deviate in some states.
To build intuition, consider the in…nite line, plane and binary tree networks depicted in Figure 2 , where all link capacities are equal to a …xed number c. 7 For these examples, we assume that endowment shocks are independent across agents, and take values + or with equal probability. We focus on implementing equal sharing, i.e., an arrangement where all agents consume the per capita average endowment. This allocation is Pareto-optimal when agents have identical preferences over consumption. Since our example networks are in…nite, the law of large numbers implies that the average endowment is zero; equal sharing thus requires all agents to consume zero with probability one.
Consider an interval set of consecutive agents F on the line (see Figure 2A ). The coalitional constraint for F is most likely to bind in the positive probability event where all agents in F receive a positive shock + . In this event, the zero consumption pro…le dictates that members of F give jF j to the rest of the community; but they can only commit to giving up c [F ] = 2c. Coalition proofness thus requires 2c jF j for all F . However, for any …xed c, this is violated for long enough intervals F . A similar negative result holds for the more expansive plane network in Figure 2B . The perimeter of a square-shaped set F is c [F ] = 4c p jF j; for a large enough square, this is smaller than jF j , which is how much members of F would have to give up if they all get a positive shock + .
However, these perimeter bounds do not rule out equal sharing for the yet more expansive binary tree in Figure 2C . Here, the perimeter of any set F is at least jF j, and so for c , no coalition of agents has to give up more than their group obligation in any realization.
These examples suggest that equal sharing can only be incentive compatible in networks with good expansion properties, i.e., where the perimeter of sets grows in proportion with set size. To measure expansiveness, we de…ne the "perimeter-area ratio"
where area stands for the number of agents in F . Intuitively, a [F ] represents the group's maximum obligation to the community relative to the group's size. The next result tightens 7 We consider in…nite networks here because they are useful for building intuition.
the connection between expansiveness and insurance by characterizing full risk-sharing in any network in terms of a [F ] , under the assumptions that (1) the support of e i is the same compact interval of length S for all agents; and (2) the support of e i given any realization of (e i ) is the same as its unconditional support, for all i. 
S.
The condition implies that a [F ] must be greater than the constant S=2 for any set of size at most half the community. In particular, a [F ] must be bounded away from zero for such sets as the network size grows without bound. The intuition builds on our earlier examples: risk-sharing between F and the rest of the community is hardest to support when everyone in F gets the maximum realization and everyone outside F gets the minimum. The above inequality ensures that the group has a large enough perimeter to credibly pledge the required resources even in such extreme realizations. The condition is violated for big groups on the line and plane networks because a [F ] can be arbitrarily small, and only holds for highly expansive graphs like the binary tree.
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Full insurance in real world networks. We use data from a village community in Huaraz, Peru to show that real-world networks are unlikely to be expansive enough to allow for full insurance.
10 Figure 3A compares the expansiveness of the Huaraz network with the line, plane, and in…nite binary tree. For all these networks, link capacities are assumed to be equal across links and normalized so that the per household average capacity is one. To measure expansiveness, we construct, for each household, a collection of "ball" sets which contain all households within a …xed social distance r. We then calculate the average of the perimeter-area ratio and set size for each r, and plot the perimeter-area ratio as a function of size for all four networks. Comparing across our three example networks illustrates our earlier discussion: This curve lies slightly above the plane but well below the in…nite binary tree, and approaches zero as set sizes grow, with a slope that parallels the curve for the plane. It follows that the Huaraz network is less expansive than the in…nite binary tree, and hence our model predicts that full insurance is not coalition-proof. The result is the same if we look at the two sub-network of relatives and non-relative friends, respectively, in Figure 3B : the nonrelative network is slightly more expansive, but does not approach the expansiveness of the binary tree. Figure 3 suggests that the expansion properties of the Huaraz network are similar to the plane. A plausible reason is that the Huaraz network, like many social networks in practice, is partly organized on the basis of geographic distance. For example, the average distance between two connected agents in this network is only 42 meters, while the average distance between two randomly selected addresses is 132 meters. This correlation between distance and network connections can result in expansion properties similar to the plane, if agents tend to have friends at close physical distance in multiple directions, e.g., both horizontally and vertically on a map. This logic suggests that to understand partial insurance in real world networks, we should focus on plane-like networks.
Partial risk-sharing in less expansive networks
Plane networks turn out to be just su¢ ciently well-connected to generate very good risksharing in most states of the world. The key insight is that with a two-dimensional structure, outcomes where the coalitional constraint binds under equal sharing become rare. To see the logic, consider again the regular plane with the i.i.d. + = shocks. As we have seen, equal sharing fails because households in a large n by n square F would need to give up n 2 resources if all of them get a positive shock, which is an order of magnitude larger than the
The key is that for large n, such extreme realizations are unlikely, and in typical realizations the required transfers do not exceed the perimeter. With i.i.d. shocks, the standard deviation of the group's endowment is only n , which is only of order n even though it is the sum of n 2 random variables -intuitively, a lot of the idiosyncratic shocks cancel out within the group. 11 Thus the "typical shock" in F has the same order of magnitude as the maximum pledgeable amount, and hence potentially deviating coalitions are rare. The same logic works with correlated shocks, as long as correlation declines fast enough with distance.
By way of contrast, the argument breaks down for the line, since the perimeter of even large interval sets is only 2c, a constant.
Plane and line networks
Our intuitive analysis suggests that when shocks are not too correlated, risk-sharing on the plane should be reasonably good, and substantially better than on the line. We …rst formalize these ideas and then extend them to less regular networks.
Partial risk-sharing measure. We measure partial risk-sharing as the average utility loss relative to the benchmark of equal sharing where all agents consume the average endowment e = e W =jW j :
11 The sum of n 2 i.i.d. random variables has variance n 2 2 and hence standard deviation n .
This "utility-based dispersion," is simply the di¤erence between average utility under partial and full sharing. Here we ignore the dependence of utility on link consumption to simplify notation.
If all agents have the same quadratic utility function over x, then we can express U DISP as an increasing function of
which is the square-root of the expected cross-sectional variance of x. For non-quadratic utilities, SDISP (x) can be interpreted as a second order approximation of the utility based measure. SDISP is a tractable measure that inherits the intuitive properties of U DISP :
it is zero only under equal sharing and positive otherwise, and its magnitude measures the departure from equal sharing: e.g., if e i are + = with equal probabilities, then in autarky
We use SDISP as our central measure in the analysis below.
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Shocks with limited correlation. While we focused on i.i.d. symmetric shocks in our example, the formal result accommodates much more general endowment shocks. The key requirements are that shocks do not have fat tails and are not too correlated; we formalize these using assumptions (P1) to (P5) below. From now on we use the convention that K, K 0 and K 00 denote positive constants, but their values at di¤erent occurrences may be di¤erent.
We model the source of uncertainty as a collection of independent random variables y j , j = 1; :::; 1, which can represent both idiosyncratic shocks like illness and aggregate shocks like weather. Like in a factor model, endowments are determined as linear functions of these basic shocks: e i = P j ij y j .where ij measures the extent to which agent i is exposed to shock j. We assume that e i and y j satisfy the following.
(P1) [Thin tails] y j are independent, have zero mean and unit variance, and satisfy that Formal results. We now state the formal result on risk-sharing on the plane and line networks. We focus on in…nite networks because they are more convenient for stating our asymptotic result. (ii) On the in…nite plane with capacities c, we have SDISP (x) K 0 exp K 00 c 2=3 for some incentive-compatible risk-sharing arrangement.
This Proposition characterizes the rate of convergence to full risk-sharing as capacities increase. The contrast between the line and plane is remarkable. Risk-sharing is relatively poor on the line: SDISP goes to zero at a slow polynomial rate of 1=c as c goes to in…nity. In contrast, the rate of convergence for the plane is exponentially fast, con…rming our intuition that agents are able to share typical shocks due to the more expansive structure.
The proof of (i) essentially builds on our earlier arguments: for long enough intervals, much of the interval-speci…c shock must remain trapped in the set, because the perimeter is only 2c. Even if agents perfectly smooth inside the interval, overall dispersion remains high.
The result for the plane is much more di¢ cult, and requires going beyond our previous intuition: even though the coalitional constraint is rarely violated for any particular set F, we need an allocation that satis…es the constraints of all sets. Equivalently, we need to construct a transfer arrangement such that the typical ‡ow on every link meets the capacity constraint. The key idea is to construct this arrangement from the ground up. First we partition the plane into 2 by 2 squares of agents and implement equal sharing in each of these. Then we implement fully sharing in 4 by 4 squares, then in 8 by 8 ones, and so on. After n iterations, we obtain full sharing of endowments in 2 n by 2 n "super-squares".
Because each link is used once in every round, the construction uses every link at most n times. By our earlier intuition, each time a link is used, the required transfer is typically of order one, resulting in a total ‡ow per link of order n. This is the uniform bound on the ‡ow over every link that we require for exponentially good risk-sharing. Since the arrangement
does not yet account for capacity constraints, we use the theory of large deviations to bound the exceptional event when incentive compatibility is violated, obtaining the bound in the proposition.
Simulations. Numerical simulations suggest that the asymptotic results of the Proposition provide a good description of behavior for …nite c as well. Figure 4 shows constrained optimal allocations for …nite line and plane networks, for a given realization of uniform shocks with support [ 1; 1]. 13 Figure 4A shows the endowment realizations for both the line and the plane network: darker red (green) squares correspond to lower (higher) endowments.
We use the same vector of realizations for both networks. The SDISP of these realizations is 0:55 in the absence of any insurance. Now consider Figure 4B , where we assume that the average capacity per agent is 1: thus each link has value c = 0:5 in the line network and c = 0:25 in the plane. For these capacities, the …gure depicts the optimal, SDISP minimizing incentive compatible allocation. The contrast between the line and the plane is 40   41   42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   61   62   63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81   82   83   84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18   19   20   21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39   40   41   42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   61   62   63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81   82   83   84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18   19   20   21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39   40   41   42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   61   62   63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81   82   83   84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98 remarkable: for the line, we see substantial color variation re ‡ecting imperfect risk-sharing (SDISP = 24%), while the plane achieves better insurance (SDISP = 12%). As capacities increase, the contrast becomes sharper. In Figure 4C , the per capita capacity in both networks is assumed to be 1:4, SDISP on the line is still 20%, while on the plane it falls to 3%. Finally, in Figure 4D , when the per capita capacity is 2, dispersion on the line falls to 14% while full risk-sharing is achieved on the plane (SDISP = 0). We conclude that the asymptotic results of the Proposition provide a good characterization of insurance behavior in …nite networks and for …nite c as well.
Geographic networks
If real world networks are similar to the plane, Proposition 2 suggests that they should allow for reasonably good risk-sharing. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, real-world social networks have a much less regular structure. Nevertheless, these networks can often be represented in a way that closely resembles a regular plane, because in the physical map of the community, households tend to have social connections at close distances and in multiple directions.
Intuitively, if a su¢ ciently accurate representation of this sort does exist, then our results on good risk-sharing are likely to carry over to real world social networks.
To formally de…ne what makes a representation "su¢ ciently accurate," we consider (1) a function : W ! R 2 that maps agents in a social network to locations in R 2 ; and (2) A network is called a geographic network if it has a representation that is even, local, and has no separating avenues, and all link capacities are bounded away from zero.
Corollary 1 In a geographic network, if (P1)-(P5) is satis…ed, then there exist positive constants K 0 and K 00 such that SDISP (x) K 0 exp K 00 c 2=3 for some incentive-compatible risk-sharing arrangement.
Thus the risk-sharing properties of geographic networks are similar to the plane. The proof combines Proposition 2 with a renormalization argument. We take a geographic network, and superimpose on its planar representation a grid with A by A squares. We then merge all people within each square to create a new network. Because of the key no separating avenues condition, this new network is essentially a plane, and hence Proposition 2 (ii)
can be applied to yield a bound for SDISP in the new network. We then pull this bound back to the old network using the fact that the embedding is even and local.
Geographic networks in practice. We next check whether the Huaraz village network is a geographic network. Figure 5A shows the natural geographic map of household locations, referred to as lots, in this village. In Figure 5B the horizontal and vertical coordinates of the map are re-scaled to …t the community into the unit square, and a grid of 16 squares is also depicted. As is clear from Figure 5B , this representation is unlikely to satisfy the geographic networks condition, because there are empty squares and the distribution of agents is quite heterogeneous. To construct a "geographic" representation of this Huaraz community, we transform the map using a di¤usion algorithm described in detail in the supplementary appendix. The basic idea is to stretch the network uniformly over the unit square using a procedure in which nearby lots "repel" each other and hence lots will tend to escape to empty spaces. Figures 5C and 5D depict the result after one and …ve rounds of iteration: the distribution of lots becomes gradually more homogenous. After 23 iterations ( Figure 5E ), the distribution of lots is almost completely uniform. Figure 5E also shows the number of lots in each of the 16 squares, con…rming that we have an even embedding.
To evaluate the key "no separating avenues"condition, Figure 5E also shows the number 14 A geographic network is by assumption in…nite; we de…ne SDISP for these networks as the lim sup of (2) over a sequence of increasing squares in the map representation. The exact sequence does not matter for the results. The …nding that the Huaraz community is a "geographic network"in part because connections are correlated with physical distance suggests that village networks in developing countries may be similarly expansive. Our results then imply that typical village networks should facilitate high, although imperfect, levels of informal risk-sharing -a result consistent with the empirical …ndings of Townsend (1994) , Ogaki and Zhang (2001) , Mazzocco (2007) and others.
Risk-sharing ability of a group
One commonly used approach to testing full risk-sharing in the data is to regress the consumption of an individual or a group on their own endowment and a community-wide shock.
A variant of this regression when there is no aggregate uncertainty is
where consumption in F is regressed on the endowment shock of F . Equal sharing implies = 0; this corresponds to the test of full risk-sharing used in Cochrane (1991 ), Mace (1991 , Townsend (1994) and others. When 6 = 0, equal sharing is rejected; however, small magnitudes of the coe¢ cient can be interpreted to mean that agents in F share their risk with the rest of the community reasonably well. The following result supports this interpretation.
Proposition 3 We can bound the regression coe¢ cient as
This lower bound is a function of the perimeter c [F ] relative to the standard deviation of the community-speci…c shock F . The intuition is familiar: when the perimeter of a set is small, much of the idiosyncratic shock is trapped inside F , resulting in higher correlation.
The Proposition is related to Townsend's (1994) …nding that there is considerable risk-sharing within, but only limited sharing across villages, as well as Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) who
show that Indian households try to create cross-village family links through marriage. Our results are consistent with these facts if cross-village network ties are relatively weaker.
Constrained e¢ cient risk-sharing
In this section, we study constrained e¢ cient arrangements which are Pareto-optimal given the enforcement constraints imposed by the network. Such second-best arrangements are a natural benchmark because they achieve the highest possible level of risk-sharing in a given network. As we show below, foundations for these arrangements include both simple rules of thumb and dynamic coalitional bargaining.
Risk-sharing islands
Our main result is that constrained-e¢ cient insurance arrangements exhibit an "island structure."For every realization of endowments, connected islands of agents emerge endogenously, such that risk-sharing is perfect within each island, while links between di¤erent islands are "blocked" in the sense that transfers equal the link capacities. This result follows from the equivalence between constrained e¢ cient arrangements and a planner's problem formalized below.
The intuition for islands can be seen by focusing on a utilitarian social planner who maximizes average expected utility. Whenever two agents consume di¤erent amounts, this planner can increase welfare by shifting a small amount from the agent with higher-to the one with lower consumption. But in the optimum, such shifts must violate the enforcement constraints. Hence linked agents either consume the same amount and belong to the same "island", or consume di¤erent amounts and are connected by a blocked link that does not allow for further transfers. Panels B-D of Figure 4 depict constrained e¢ cient allocations corresponding to such a social planner: islands within which consumption is equalized are indicated by di¤erent colors.
For a formal analysis, let ( i ) be a set of positive weights, and de…ne the planner's problem
subject to the constraint that all transfers respect the capacity constraints of the social network.
Proposition 4 Every constrained e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement is the solution to a planner's problem with some set of weights ( i ). Conversely, any solution to the planner's problem is constrained e¢ cient.
Wilson (1968) establishes a similar equivalence result for risk-sharing in syndicates. His proof builds on the convexity of the set of possible payo¤ vectors. Since an e¢ cient allocation must lie on the boundary of this set, convexity implies the existence of a tangent hyperplane with some normal vector ( i ). Maximizing a planner's problem with these i weights will then select the e¢ cient allocation. Adapting this argument to our model requires that the set of coalition-proof payo¤ vectors be convex. This is straightforward given the perfect substitutes speci…cation: when two transfers satisfy a capacity constraint, their convex combination will also satisfy it. 16 The formal proof is provided in Appendix A.
Observe that maximizing the planner's expected utility E P i U i is equivalent to maximizing realized utility P i U i independently for each state. This yields a set of intuitive 16 See section 4 for extending this result to imperfect substitutes.
…rst-order conditions for each realization. To state these conditions, recall that a link from i to j is blocked in a given realization if t ij = c (i; j), i.e., if the link is used at full capacity.
Proposition 5 An incentive-compatible arrangement (t ij ) is constrained e¢ cient if and only if there exist positive weights ( i ) i2W such that for every i; j 2 W one of the following conditions hold:
j (x j ) and the link from i to j is blocked.
This result generalizes our earlier intuition for arbitrary welfare weights. Su¢ ciency and uniqueness of the …rst-order conditions follow from the strict concavity of the planner's objective function and the convexity of the domain. The Proposition also implies that for any pair of agents i and j, if i U 0 i < j U 0 j , then along every all path connecting i and j, at least one link must be blocked. Therefore, in any realization agents can be partitioned into connected risk-sharing islands such that within an island agents share risk perfectly, while cross-island insurance is limited because boundary links operate at full capacity.
Proposition 6 [Risk-sharing islands] In any realization (e i ) the set of agents can be parti-
Sharing islands partition the network in each realization. Using the coalitional interpretation, these islands can be thought of in terms of "almost-deviating coalitions." For example, if all links on the boundary of an island are blocked in the outward direction, then members of this are transferring the highest amount they can credibly pledge to the community, and hence are indi¤erent to deviating as a coalition. More generally, it can be shown that the island decomposition obtains by splitting the network along the boundaries of all almost-deviating coalitions. In e¤ect, almost deviating coalitions act as "bottleneck groups"limiting the ‡ow of resources in a way parallel to the bottleneck agents emphasized in Bloch et al. (2008) . The emergence of network-based risk-pooling islands is consistent with evidence documented by Attanasio et al. (2009) that about the importance of social ties in the formation of insurance groups in Colombian villages.
When link capacities increase, the planner becomes less constrained and risk-sharing islands tend to grow in size. This is illustrated by Figure 4 , panels B to D. In Figure 4B , where per capita capacity is one, insurance is fairly local: there are 30 islands on the line and 17 on the plane. As the per capita capacity goes up to 1:4, in Figure 4C there are 17 islands on the line and only 4 on the plane; and in Figure 4D where average capacity is 2 per agent, there are 13 islands on the line and just one, fully insured island on the plane. In these simulations, the number of islands closely tracks the degree of insurance.
As is clear from Figure 4 , in the island partition the size and location of islands, and hence the set of agents who fully share each others'shocks, is endogenous to the realization and the network. This result di¤erentiates our model from group-based models of risk-sharing, where insurance groups are exogenous and do not vary with the realization.
Spillover e¤ects and local sharing
The island result also helps us characterize how shocks propagate in the network as a function of social distance. We show that shocks are shared to a greater degree with socially close agents, and hence network-based insurance is local: the consumption of socially close agents comoves more strongly than that of socially distant ones.
To formalize this point, we must introduce a slightly stronger de…nition of risk-sharing islands. Fix an endowment realization (e i ), and let W (i) denote the sharing island containing i as de…ned above. We now de…ne c W (i) to be the maximal connected set of agents j such that there exists a path between i and j along which no links are blocked in either direction.
With this de…nition, c W (i) W (i), because Proposition 6 implies that links connecting di¤erent islands are all blocked. Except for knife-edge cases when the transfer amount just reaches the capacity over a link but does not "bind"yet, the two de…nitions are equivalent: c W (i) = W (i). It can be shown that these knife-edge cases have zero probability when the distribution of shocks is absolutely continuous, and hence the two de…nitions can be treated as equivalent for practical purposes.
We now explore the e¤ects of an idiosyncratic shock to one agent's endowment on the consumption of others. Fix a constrained e¢ cient arrangement, and consider two realizations e = (e i ) and e 0 = (e 0 i ), where e 0 i < e i for some i but e 0 j = e j for all others j 6 = i. E¤ectively, agent i is experiencing an idiosyncratic negative shock in e 0 relative to e (or a positive shock like aid in e relative to e 0 ). We can measure the impact of this negative shock on another agent j by computing the ratio of marginal utilities of j before and after the shock. Formally, let x and x 0 denote the consumption vectors associated with e and e 0 , then we can de…ne
which measures the marginal utility cost of the shock for agent j. A larger M U C j corresponds to a higher increase in marginal utility and hence a greater consumption drop.
Proposition 7 [Spillovers and local sharing] In any second best arrangement x:
(ii) [Local sharing] There exists > 0 such that
, and x j (e 0 ) = x j (e) for all j 2 W nW (i): The results of Proposition 7 are summarized in Figure 6 , which shows the marginal utility cost of direct and indirect friends in response to a shock to i. The horizontal axis is the marginal utility cost of i himself while the vertical axis measures the M U C of direct and indirect friends. For small shocks, both direct and indirect friends in the same island help out. As the size of the shock grows, some indirect friends hit their capacity constraints (dotted line), but some direct friends continue to help (heavy line). After a point, all direct friends hit their capacity constraints and additional increases in the shock are fully borne by agent i. These implications can be used to test our model against other theories of limited risk-sharing, which do not predict variation in the degree of insurance as a function of network distance.
The results of Proposition 7 are consistent with the empirical …ndings in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) , who show that Progresa, a conditional cash transfer program in rural Mexico, leads to an increase in the consumption of the non-treated, which they attribute to the spillover e¤ect of aid through the social network of the village. This is the logic of part (i) in the Proposition. Angelucci et al. (2008) also show that much of the increase in the consumption of the non-treated is due to the consumption increase of households who are relatives of the treated, consistent with (ii) and (iii). The agreement between our results and existing evidence suggests that a calibrating our model may be useful for quantifying the welfare e¤ects of development aid taking into account network-based spillovers.
Foundations for constrained e¢ ciency
We now brie ‡y discuss two intuitive dynamic mechanisms that provide foundations for constrained e¢ ciency. The supplementary appendix contains the corresponding formal results.
First consider a decentralized procedure where agents use a simple rule of thumb in helping those who are in need. In every round, agents attempt to equate weighted marginal utilities between neighbors subject to the capacity constraints: intuitively, people help out less fortunate friends. This procedure converges to the constrained e¢ cient allocation corresponding to the welfare weights used. In particular, constrained e¢ ciency can emerge even if in every transaction agents only use local information about the current resources of the parties involved.
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A second mechanism is collective dynamic bargaining with renegotiation. Gomes (2000) shows that when agents can propose renegotiable arrangements to subgroups and make sidepayments in a dynamic bargaining procedure, ultimately a Pareto-e¢ cient arrangement will be selected. 19 This result can be incorporated in our model by assuming that there is a negotiations phase prior to the endowment realization, and would imply that agents select a constrained e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement.
We also note that constrained e¢ cient arrangements are particularly stable in that they are also robust to ex ante coalitional deviations, not just ex post ones.
Discussion: General preferences
This section discusses how our results extend when goods and friendship are imperfect substitutes. Formal statements and proofs are presented in the supplementary appendix, here we only summarize our …ndings.
With a general utility function U (x; c), the de…nition of incentive compatibility (IC) of a transfer arrangement is the following:
De…nition 2 A risk-sharing arrangement t is incentive compatible (IC for short) if
for all i and j, for all realizations of uncertainty.
Our key tool is a pair of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for incentive compatibility with imperfect substitutes. To derive these, de…ne the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between good and friendship consumption as 
The limits to risk-sharing with imperfect substitutes
With imperfect substitutes, the results in section 2 extend but the upper and lower bounds on risk-sharing are weakened by constant factors that depend on the degree of substitution.
To obtain these extensions, we assume that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is uniformly bounded. We continue to …nd that the …rst-best can only be achieved in highly expansive graphs where the perimeter-area ratio is bounded from below: we require a [F ]
=M . Our …ndings about partial risk-sharing are about rates of convergence and hence they extend without modi…cation; in particular, SDISP converges exponentially for geographic networks.
Imperfect substitution also yields additional implications. If the M RS is increasing in consumption, then agents with low consumption value their friends less, reducing the maximum amount they are willing to give up. As a result, if in a society that experiences a negative aggregate shock, the scope for insuring idiosyncratic risk is reduced. We show that reducing the endowments of all agents results in a smaller set of incentive compatible transfer arrangements, and hence an increase in SDISP . The aggregate negative shock is thus a double burden: besides its direct negative e¤ect on consumption, it also induces worse sharing of idiosyncratic risks, a …nding consistent with Kazianga and Udry (2006) , who document limited informal insurance during the severe draught of 1981-85 in rural Burkina Faso.
Constrained e¢ cient arrangements
The key novelty with imperfect substitutes is that changing the goods consumption of an agent a¤ects his implied link values and hence incentive compatibility. To characterize constrained e¢ ciency, we assume that the marginal rate of substitution M RS i de…ned above is concave in x i . When this holds, we can generalize Proposition 4, establishing the equivalence between constrained e¢ ciency and the planner's problem.
To develop …rst order conditions, we next analyze the e¤ect of an additional dollar to agent i on the planner's objective. With imperfect substitutes, this marginal welfare gain is no longer equal to i times the marginal utility of i, because increased consumption also softens enforcement constraints. The planner may wish to use these softer constraints and transfer some of the original dollar to neighboring agents. To formalize this, we de…ne the marginal social gain of an additional unit of transfer to i using an iterative procedure, which takes into account the indirect e¤ect of softening constraints.
Using the concept of marginal social gain allows us to extend the characterization of constrained e¢ cient agreements in Proposition 5. Given this result, we can also partition the network into endogenous risk-sharing islands, such that marginal social utility is equalized within islands, and all links connecting the island to the rest of the community are blocked.
Finally, for an agent i who is not on the boundary of his risk-sharing island and hence has no links with binding constraints, the marginal social gain does equal i times his marginal utility of consumption; hence, for such agents, the results of section 3 hold without modi…cation. For example, weighted marginal utilities are equalized for any two such agents in the same risk-sharing island. Thus if risk-sharing islands are "large", then the results from the perfect substitutes case hold without modi…cation for most agents.
Conclusion
This paper showed that the expansiveness of a social network determines the e¤ectiveness of informal risk-sharing. We found that many real-life social networks are likely to be su¢ ciently expansive to allow for good risk-sharing. We also characterized Pareto-optimal arrangements and found that resources are shared among local groups.
In future work, we would like to develop a dynamic extension of our model, where the value of a social link is partly derived from the present value of future insurance bene…ts in the network. In such a model the values of social links, the network structure, and the risk-sharing agreement would all be endogenized.
We also plan to extend our empirical analysis. Our model is su¢ ciently tractable that it can be used to estimate the strength of di¤erent types of links from social network and consumption data. Such estimates could be used for policy experiments, such as (i) measuring the welfare e¤ects of development aid, taking into account network spillovers; or (ii) comparing the network structure of communities with di¤erent degrees of ethnic heterogeneity, and exploring the implications for informal insurance.
follows from the discussion in the text. To prove necessity, let g i = e i x i the amount that i has to transfer away, and let g F = P i2F e i for any subset of agents F . Note that g W = 0 by e W = x W . Let U be the set of agents for whom g i 0 and let D = W nU .
De…ne the auxiliary graph G 0 which has two additional vertices, s and t, and additional edges connecting s with all agents in U , and additional edges connecting t with all agents in D. For any i 2 U , de…ne the capacity c (s; i) = g i and c (i; s) = 0. Similarly, for any j 2 D, let c (j; t) = g j and c (t; j) = 0.
The auxiliary graph is useful, because implementing the desired consumption allocation with a transfer scheme that meets the capacity constraints is equivalent to …nding an s ! t ‡ow in G 0 that has value g U = P g i 0 g i . To see why, note that in the desired allocation, exactly g i must leave each agent i 2 U . The capacities on the new links ensure that in any s ! t ‡ow, at most g i can leave agent i. Similarly, to implement the target, exactly g j must ‡ow to each agent j 2 D, and the capacity on the (j; t) link ensures that this is the maximum that can ‡ow to j. As a result, any ‡ow with value P g i 0 g i must, by construction, take exactly g i away from i and deliver exactly g j to j.
We have reduced our implementation problem to a ‡ow problem. To compute the maximum s ! t ‡ow, we instead compute the value of the minimum cut. Fix a minimum cut, let S be the set of agents in W that are still connected to s after the cut, and let T = W nS.
Clearly, if we consider the restriction of the cut to the original network G, there will be no surviving paths connecting some agent in S with some other agent in T .
Let U 1 U denote those agents whose link with s is cut in the minimum cut of G 0 , and let D 1 D denote those in D whose link with t is cut. Let U 2 = U nU 1 and D 2 = DnD 1 be the sets of agents whose link with s respectively t remains; then U 2 S and D 2 T , because otherwise there would be surviving path in G 0 connecting s and t after the cut. This also implies that g S g U 2 + g D 1 , because
where we used that g i 0 when i is in U and negative when i is in D.
The value of the cut in G 0 can be bounded as cut value g U 1 g D 1 + c out [S] where the …rst two terms count the total capacity of links with s and t that have been deleted, and the …nal term is a lower bound for links deleted from the original network G.
By assumption (5), c out [S] e S x S = g S , and using (6) we obtain
It follows that the value of the maximum ‡ow is at least g U , as desired.
Proof of Proposition 4
We prove the following more general result.
Suppose that the M RS i = (@U i =@c i )=(@U i =@x i ) is concave in x i for every i. Then every constrained e¢ cient arrangement is the solution to a planner's problem with some set of weights ( i ), and conversely, any solution to the planner's problem is constrained e¢ cient.
Proof. Let U R W be the set of expected utility pro…les that can be achieved by IC transfer arrangements: U = f(v i ) i2W j9 IC allocation x such that v i EU i (x i ; c i ) 8ig. Our goal is to show that U is convex. By concave utility, it su¢ ces to prove that the set of IC arrangements is convex.
To show that the convex combination of IC arrangements is IC, …x an endowment realization e and let x be an IC allocation. Consider an agent i, and for r 0 de…ne y (r; x i ) to be the consumption level that makes i indi¤erent between his current allocation and reducing friendship consumption by r units, that is, U (x i ; c i ) = U (y (r; x i ) ; c i r). For di¤erent values of r, the locations (y (r; x i ) ; c r) trace out an indi¤erence curve of i. Note that y (0; x i ) = x i and that the IC constraint for the transfer between i and j can be written as t ij y (c (i; j) ; x i ) x i
since y (c (i; j) ; x i ) x i is the dollar gain that makes i accept losing the friendship with j.
